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n her recent book Self-Constitution, Christine Korsgaard pre-
sents a new angle on the broadly Kantian approach to ethics 
she has taken in previous works. This new angle places a 
more direct emphasis on the constitution of agency. The 
fundamentals of her theory, however, remain roughly the same; 
like in Sources of Normativity and Creating the Kingdom of Ends, 
Korsgaard rests her account on the “plight” of human choice, the 
reflective distance we have from our inclinations, and the free 
will’s legislation of universal maxims. In this sense, though Plato 
and Aristotle play a more prominent role in Self-Constitution than 
they do in its predecessors, Korsgaard is still on firmly Kantian 
turf.  
Such turf has traditionally been criticized for its inability to 
capture the richness of our normative lives. Hegel, for example, 
contrasted the abstraction of Kantian universality with Sittlich-
keit, the concrete ethical life. To buttress her account against such 
critiques, Korsgaard emphasizes the role of what she calls 
“practical identities” – value-laden conceptions of ourselves that 
govern our choice of actions. In this paper, I will argue that such 
a buttress is inadequate. My argument will focus on a particular 
type of choice that a Korsgaardian agent must make: the choice 
between different morally-permissible practical identities. Such a 
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choice requires reasons; we must think of some practical identi-
ties as non-morally better than others. Korsgaard, I will argue, 
cannot give a satisfactory account of such reasons. To demon-
strate this, I will examine three possible ways in which 
Korsgaard could explain choice between permissible practical 
identities – in terms of existing identities, in terms of epistemic 
ideals, and in terms of pure will. None of these possibilities, I 
submit, can get Korsgaard what she needs. Examining them, 
though, reveals the central problem: despite her attempts, 
Korsgaard has not adequately addressed the problem of the 
empty self. I will conclude by suggesting a way she might be 
able to do so, were she willing to weaken her voluntarism about 
practical identity.  
 
I. 
Korsgaard’s account rests on a number of key Kantian prem-
ises. The first is a claim about human consciousness, which, in 
Self-Constitution, receives its most explicit elucidation during 
Korsgaard’s discussion of the differences between non-human 
animals and humans. Animals, for Korsgaard, are presented 
with motivationally loaded representations – what Korsgaard 
calls “incentives” – just as humans are, and animals, like hu-
mans, respond to those incentives on the basis of principles. For 
animals, however, these principles are simply instincts; the ani-
mal plays no role in choosing them. Developments in human 
consciousness, however, have liberated our species from the con-
trol of instinct: “self-consciousness opens up a space between the 
incentive and the response, a space of what I call reflective dis-
tance.”1 In this space, we must choose the principles that will gov-
ern how we respond to our incentives. In doing so, we freely de-
termine what we will take to be worthwhile and valuable. Such a 
choice is not optional. Rather, it is the human plight. We are con-
demned to choose, and choice requires that we treat some things 
as reason-giving. 
From the necessity of this choice, Korsgaard attempts to de-
rive the normativity of the categorical imperative. In Sources of 
Normativity, her route to this destination is straightforwardly 
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Kantian; for our choice of a principle to be free, it must be entire-
ly self-determined. We must, in Kant’s language, give the law to 
ourselves.2 The only constraint on our doing so is that the law we 
choose must have the form of a law – that is, we must be able to 
will our maxim universally. In Self-Constitution, Korsgaard ar-
rives at this same conclusion from a slightly different direction. 
One of the essential attributes of an agent, she argues, is autono-
my. An agent’s movements must be her own, stemming from her 
own free, unified causality rather than a force acting on her or in 
her. Such autonomy, says Korsgaard, precludes any kind of 
“particularistic willing.” Unless the agent wills her maxims uni-
versally, she will be identified completely with the incentives she 
acts on, and will thus be rendered “not one person, but a series, a 
mere heap, of unrelated impulses.”3 The categorical imperative, 
then, is a constitutive principle for acting as a genuine agent.   
For the purposes of this paper, whether either of these argu-
ments succeeds is in some sense irrelevant; what matters is that 
even if they do succeed, they leave whole territories of norma-
tivity uncharted. The categorical imperative only tells us which 
incentives we are obligated to refrain from acting on, thereby 
whittling down the set of possible actions to include only those 
that are morally permissible. But among these remaining actions, 
some options are still better than others. Presented with the 
choice between picking my nose and learning to paint, I receive 
no guidance from the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, we 
want to say that there is another, non-obligatory type of norma-
tivity that grounds my choice to pick up the brush. Indeed, it is 
primarily this type of normativity that we deal with on an every-
day basis. Most of our decisions – what to eat, which subject to 
study, who to befriend or marry – do not depend on our view of 
moral obligation but rather on our conception of what is valua-
ble, prudent, and intrinsically worthwhile – in essence, what we 
think about the good life. As Sidgwick and Anscombe have both 
suggested, this separation between the Good and the Right – 
where only the latter implicates notions of obligation, blame, and 
legislation – is a uniquely modern development.4 Nevertheless, 
an adequate analysis of normativity has to capture both. 
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In order to do so, Korsgaard builds into her account a central 
role for what she calls “practical identities” – i.e. “descriptions 
under which you value yourself and find your life worth living 
and your actions worth undertaking.”5 Korsgaard allows this 
definition extremely wide scope. It encompasses “roles and rela-
tionships, citizenship, memberships in ethnic or religious groups, 
causes, vocations, professions, and offices” – anything that pro-
vides you with a conception of the good robust enough to facili-
tate choice between different morally-permissible actions.6 For 
example, I choose to paint rather than to pick my nose because I 
identify as an artist and not as a professional nose-picker. Note, 
however, that my practical identity is not the end for which my 
chosen action provides the means.7 Under normal circumstances, 
I do not paint so that I can be or remain an artist. Rather, my 
identity as an artist is what gives value to painting; insofar as I 
am an artist, I will take incentives to paint as reason-giving. Of 
course, the mandates of my practical identities must be con-
sistent with the moral law. The identities themselves, though, 
guide my choices in a way that the moral law cannot.  
Because of its capacity to capture the normative richness of 
everyday life, Korsgaard’s account of practical identity is one of 
the more attractive features of her project. Problems arise, how-
ever, when we begin to ask questions about the normativity of 
the practical identities themselves. These questions are provoked 
by Korsgaard’s insistence that our participation in our practical 
identities is entirely voluntary. For Korsgaard, we humans are 
uniquely tasked with making ourselves who we are. Of course, 
many of our identities are deeply contingent – I did not choose to 
be born in this particular country, for example, or to be endowed 
with this particular set of talents and interests – but Korsgaard 
makes clear that “whether you treat [these identities] as a source 
of reasons and obligations is up to you.”8 If I so choose, I can 
leave any of my identities behind and take up another set 
(though I will need at least one identity in order to act at all). 
Thus, I am constantly engaged in a process of choosing and re-
choosing the identities that will be reason-giving for me: 
“whenever I act in accordance with these roles and identities, 
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whenever I allow them to govern my will, I endorse them, I em-
brace them, I affirm once again that I am them.”9 This volunta-
rism grounds my personal responsibility; on Korsgaard’s view, I 
create myself in precisely the manner that opponents of responsi-
bility deem impossible.10   
Later in this paper, I will claim that this extreme voluntarism 
about practical identity is implausible, and that Korsgaard would 
benefit from softening it. For now, though, I’d like to examine 
whether she even has the resources to sustain it at all. The prob-
lem is this: how do we choose between different morally-
permissible practical identities? Voluntarism requires that we do 
so, and once again the Categorical Imperative offers no help. In-
deed, in essence this is the same problem that we confronted 
with regard to choosing between morally-permissible inclina-
tions – a problem that practical identities were meant to solve. 
Now, though, it seems that the problem has only been pushed 
back. If my practical identity grounds my choices, what can 
ground my choice of practical identity?  
If we look to common-sense deliberation, of course, the an-
swer to this question is fairly obvious: for a variety of reasons, 
we think that some practical identities are better than others. 
When choosing a career, for example, criteria such as impact, 
pleasure, social status, fitness to my interests and talents, etc. all 
combine to give me more reason to be an artist than a profession-
al nose-picker. Korsgaard’s challenge is to make sense of such 
reasons. Few of her comments do so explicitly. Drawing on other 
aspects of her account, then, I will examine three ways in which 
she might attempt the task.  
 
II. 
The first is this: Korsgaard could appeal to contingent facts 
about what you take to be important. This is the approach most 
obviously continuous with Korsgaard’s project; as she puts it in 
Sources of Normativity,  
Kant urges us to take things to be important because they 
are important to us. And this means we must do so in full 
acceptance of the fact that what specifically is important 
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to us is at bottom contingent and conditional, determined 
by biological, psychological, and historical conditions that 
themselves are neither justified nor unjustified, but simp-
ly there. In a deep way, all of our particular values are 
ones we just happen to hold.11 
Taking such an embrace of contingency as our foundation, we 
could imagine choosing a practical identity on the basis of what 
we “just happen” to value; at the career fair, I introspect, discern 
that art happens to be more important to me than nose-picking, 
and decide to network with career-representatives accordingly. 
Such a picture has some intuitive plausibility, but critical scruti-
ny begins to reveal complications. First of all, Korsgaard’s talk 
about “what is important to us” can be taken in two ways. 
“Important to us” could mean “desired by us,” or it could mean 
“endorsed by us via rational choice.” The first falls flat; desires 
cannot ground the choice of practical identity by themselves, be-
cause for Korsgaard our bare desires are not reason-giving.12 Ra-
ther, desires only generate reasons when we freely endorse them. 
The second option, then, is the only one yielding genuine norma-
tivity. Recall, though, that we only endorse desires on the basis 
of our existing practical identities (provided they are consistent 
with the moral law). Thus, reasons to choose a new identity or to 
discard an old one could only be generated by the identities we 
already have. For example, when I introspect at the career fair, it 
must be something like my current identity as a hipster that ren-
ders art important to me, and thus that grounds my choice to be-
come an artist; by itself, a desire to make art is insufficient.   
Given the continuity between many people’s practical identi-
ties – businessmen who become golfers, journalists who become 
novelists, environmentalists who become vegans – this view can 
seem intuitive. However, its capacity to account for most of our 
choices about practical identity is extremely limited. Perhaps 
some such choices issue straightforwardly from existing practical 
identities, but a great many do not. Imagine, for example, a 
young man raised in an atheist household. One day, he happens 
to page through the family bible, which his father keeps as an 
object of curiosity and occasional ridicule. Struck by a passage 
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from Matthew, the young man begins to wonder: should I be-
come a Christian? When he consults his existing practical identi-
ties for guidance, however, he receives none. All that they tell 
him is that right now he is an atheist, and that he values rational-
ity, science, and the eradication of faith from the modern world. 
But this is no help at all, because his question is not “what do I 
value?” but “what should I value?” A nose-picker at an art gallery 
might wonder the same, or a businessman chatting with a social 
worker: “Right now I value money, prestige, and my spot at the 
yacht club. This man, though, seems to value helping the poor. 
Am I doing it wrong? Should I value what he values?” These 
questions seem genuine, and they cannot be answered by one’s 
existing practical identities, because it is precisely one’s existing 
practical identities that are being called into question. The ac-
cused cannot also be the judge. 
Some commentators – for example, Rachel Cohon and Chris-
topher Gowans – take considerations like these as evidence in 
favor of some form of moral realism.13 Indeed, as Gowans points 
out, many practical identities seem to carry realist presupposi-
tions embedded within them.14 Christianity, for example, claims 
your allegiance whatever your existing practical identities; you 
may happen to worship that false idol, but you should accept 
Christ into your heart. Artists and social workers, though per-
haps less evangelical, may give similar objective weight to their 
endeavors. To ground the choice of such identities solely in con-
tingency, then, seems to prevent full participation; in many de-
nominations, if I just happen to be a Christian, then I am not a 
genuine Christian at all. Some kind of objectivity about value, 
then, seems implicit not only in our deliberations about practical 
identity, but also in many practical identities themselves. Of 
course, such realist presuppositions may be mistaken. Insofar as 
Korsgaard wants to allow us to embrace identities containing 
them, though, she needs to give some account of normative ob-
jectivity, and an appeal to existing practical identities cannot do 
so.15 
One obvious response to this problem would be to posit a set 
of independent normative facts or truths to which our identities 
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and deliberations attempt to respond. Of course, this move 
brings with it its own epistemic and metaphysical issues, but we 
need not consider them here, because such a move is not open to 
Korsgaard; in both Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution, 
she explicitly denies the existence of objective normative facts.16 
Other accounts of normative objectivity, though, may still be 
open to her. Recall the distinction she draws between substantive 
moral realism and procedural moral realism.17 Only the former 
posits intrinsically normative entities. The latter, by contrast, 
posits a procedure according to which normative questions can be 
correctly answered. The categorical imperative test is one such 
procedure. However, it cannot help us choose among morally-
permissible identities. Appeal to existing identities is another 
such procedure, but, as we have seen, it cannot account for the 
distance between what we happen to value and what we should 
value. Perhaps, though, there are still other procedures that 
could do so, while remaining consistent with the assumptions 
undergirding Korsgaard’s project.   
 
III. 
This brings me to the second option I would like to examine: 
an appeal to ideal epistemic conditions.18 On this view, an 
agent’s reasons to choose one morally-permissible identity over 
another derive not from what happens to be important to her 
right now, but from what would be important to her if she were 
completely rational and fully equipped with the information rel-
evant to her choice.19 Such an derivation is familiar from discus-
sions about ideal judgment theory, but it receives surprisingly 
little attention in Korsgaard. Our question, then, is not whether 
Korsgaard actually appeals to ideal epistemic conditions, but 
whether she could do so and still remain consistent with the rest 
of her project. At first glance, such an appeal seems promising. It 
implicates none of the objective normative facts for which 
Korsgaard has such distaste, but it accounts for a kind of objec-
tivity nonetheless – a distance, created by our epistemic imper-
fection and our lack of information, between what we currently 
value and what we should value. Such a distance is precisely 
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what Korsgaard needs. Indeed, it may seem well-equipped to 
make sense of the examples cited previously. The atheist teenag-
er, Korsgaard could suggest, does not trust his secular practical 
identities because he is unsure of the facts they are based on. 
What if there is, in fact, a God? What if Jesus really were resur-
rected? If the teenager had all the facts relevant to the situation 
and were devoid of biases and cognitive deficiencies, he could 
discard or adjust his practical identities accordingly.  
Such epistemic hypotheticals certainly play a role in our de-
liberations: “if you only knew how much the poor are suffering,” 
says the social worker to the businessman; “if you only knew 
how sore your nostrils will get,” says the artist to the aspiring 
nose-picker. Christopher Gowans, however, suggests that they 
ultimately yield Korsgaard little advantage. I agree with this con-
clusion, but I think that the focus of Gowans’ critique is misguid-
ed.  
Gowans rightly points out that just as many practical identi-
ties carry with them beliefs about objective value, so too do many 
identities carry convictions about what conditions count as epis-
temically ideal.20 For example, a Buddhist (Gowans’ example) 
might consider mindfulness meditation an essential feature of an 
epistemic ideal, whereas a Christian might include biblical inter-
pretation, and a logical-positivist would dismiss both. How, 
then, are we to choose between these different epistemic ideals? 
Gowans considers a number of options, but dismisses them all, 
concluding that this is yet another question that Korsgaard can-
not adequately answer.  
 Such a conclusion, I think, is premature. Korsgaard may be a 
constructivist about value, but she is not a constructivist about 
epistemology – at least, not in Sources of Normativity and Self-
Constitution. Thus, it is perfectly within her power to overrule 
conflicting epistemic commitments and to specify an epistemic 
ideal valid whatever your practical identity. All it would take to 
do so would be to figure out whether meditation does in fact 
yield insight into ultimate reality, or whether biblical interpreta-
tion is in fact essential to knowledge of the universe, and to build 
those results into the epistemic condition. Such a task poses prac-
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tical difficulties, but philosophically it is relatively straightfor-
ward – there is, so to speak, a fact of the matter, and nothing in 
Korsgaard’s account denies her theoretical access to it.  
Gowans considers this approach towards the end of his pa-
per, but he argues that it would compromise what he calls the 
“Discretion Condition” – a constraint that requires that the epis-
temically ideal agent be sufficiently similar to the everyday agent 
that the latter could recognize the former’s choices as “her 
own.”21 On this view, if the epistemic ideal were to include 
mindfulness meditation, it would be too distant from the Chris-
tian’s current practical identity, and it would therefore fail to mo-
tivate her existing self. Gowans deems this distance unaccepta-
ble.  
I, however, see it as essential. The whole point of the epistem-
ic ideal is to justify our reasons to choose identities that do not 
spring from the ones we already have. Since we do not have an 
independent normative ideal to do so, we appeal to an independ-
ent epistemic ideal instead. Precisely because the validity of this 
epistemic ideal does not depend on our existing identities, it can 
exert pressure on them, creating the distance between what we 
do value and what we should value that Korsgaard needs. Gow-
ans’ emphasis on the Discretion Condition is therefore misguid-
ed. If a reasonable, philosophically genuine young-earth crea-
tionist were to learn for certain that the Bible, taken literally, does 
not yield an accurate picture of world history, this challenge to 
his epistemic commitments would not fall on ears deafened by 
his existing identity; rather, it would give him reason to change 
that identity. In this sense, facts about the correct epistemology 
are included in the set of facts relevant to deciding between iden-
tities – a set to which the epistemically ideal agent has complete 
access. If such access rules certain epistemically-misguided iden-
tities out of court, then all the more reason to choose anew.  
Pace Gowans, then, the problem with appealing to such an 
ideal is not that different identities carry different epistemic com-
mitments; rather, it is that in many cases such an ideal does not 
adequately determine the type of normativity looked for when 
choosing among morally-permissible practical identities. To see 
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this, let us return once again to the businessman and the social 
worker. The former says to the latter, “should I value what you 
value?” The latter responds, “You would if you knew how much 
the poor were suffering.” But say that the businessman does 
know how much the poor are suffering. His (morally-
permissible) job requires thorough and accurate knowledge 
about the conditions of the world’s poorest populations. In fact, 
the businessman knows substantially more about poverty than 
the social worker, and he is far more rational to boot. In every 
relevant sense, he is much closer to the epistemic ideal than his 
interlocutor. Yet his knowledge of the facts quickly ceases to help 
answer his question, because his question is about how he 
should value those facts. Even in epistemically ideal conditions, 
this question would remain, and in a sense we would be back 
where we started, appealing to existing practical identities and 
finding them inadequate to the task.  
Perhaps a defender of epistemic ideals could respond that the 
businessman is not, in fact, as close to the epistemic ideal as I 
have suggested. Sure, he can rattle off statistics about global pov-
erty, he even has comprehensive knowledge of its history, conse-
quences, and connection to other world affairs, but he has not 
realized his knowledge – it’s just a bunch of dry facts. To really 
understand what’s going on, he needs to spend days looking into 
the eyes of starving children, or denying medicine to mothers in 
need. He needs to be touched, to find certain facts reason-giving, 
and until he is, he cannot be considered epistemically well-
equipped. Such a view could be hashed out in two ways, both of 
which are not open to Korsgaard. The first would be to say that 
certain values need to be included in the set of facts that an epis-
temically ideal agent “knows.” As we have seen, though, 
Korsgaard explicitly denies the existence of normative facts or 
entities, so this option is off the table. The second would be to say 
that an epistemically ideal agent must be pre-equipped with cer-
tain values governing its reaction to the facts. For Korsgaard, 
though, this would be to saddle the epistemically-ideal agent 
with a practical identity. The problem, then, would be to decide 
which among the morally-permissible identities to choose, and 
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the whole problem would start all over. Thus, while a substan-
tive moral realist might be able to embrace this view of ideal 
epistemology, Korsgaard cannot.  
 Ideal epistemic conditions, then, can no more ground our 
choice of practical identity then our existing practical identities 
can. Before moving on to a third and final option, though, I want 
to say a brief word about a larger objection that has been loom-
ing over the last two sections of this paper. On both an existing 
identities view and an ideal epistemic conditions view, the will is 
almost entirely passive. Its only real contribution to an agent’s 
choice is to test her principle against the categorical imperative, 
which is the will’s only internal law; for the rest of the will’s nor-
mative work, it must rely entirely on resources external to itself – 
in this case, on the incentives endorsed by an agent’s existing 
practical identities. Such passivity runs counter to Korsgaard’s 
repeated insistence throughout both Sources of Normativity and 
Self-Constitution that we actively make our practical identities 
what they are: “we enter into their construction… they are in 
part the result of our own activity.”22 This tension should moti-
vate us to seek a way to choose between permissible practical 
identities that gives a more active role to our free will.  
 
IV. 
An extreme view of how to do so could be this: there is noth-
ing that grounds your choice of practical identity but the choice 
itself. When confronted with such a decision, you need not and 
you cannot look to your existing identities, to ideal epistemic 
conditions, or to your incentives for help; you must, so to speak, 
just choose – albeit, in a manner consistent with the moral law. 
When you do so, your chosen identity becomes normative for you 
in a way it could never be prior to your choice. Your endorse-
ment makes its object important.   
Such a view gives to the free will the active role in construct-
ing normativity that appeals to existing identities and epistemic 
ideals cannot. What’s more, it fits well with many of Korsgaard’s 
remarks about our ability to choose our non-moral ends. For ex-
ample, in Creating the Kingdom of Ends she claims that “the dis-
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tinctive feature of humanity, as such, is simply the capacity to 
take a rational interest in something: to decide, under the influ-
ence of reason, that something is desirable, that it is worthy of 
pursuit or realization, that it is to be deemed important or valua-
ble.”23 Our freedom consists in the opportunity to make this deci-
sion on our own, liberated from the external forces impinging on 
our autonomy. When we do so, we are not responding to “good-
making properties of objects”; rather, “it is our own choices that 
ultimately confer value on objects.”24 On this view, it is the 
artist’s choice to value art that makes being an artist normative 
for her, the social worker’s choice to value the poor that makes 
her work worthwhile. The agent is the source of normativity; 
even beyond the Categorical Imperative, she remains truly her 
own law.  
The problems with this view, however, are manifold. The 
first and most obvious is that it is quite counter-intuitive. A so-
cial worker does not see the value of helping the poor as a prod-
uct of her choice to do so; rather, she sees her choice as a product 
of its object’s value. Moreover, while this view can account for 
the normativity of the chosen identity, it cannot account for the 
normativity of unchosen identities. As Stephen Darwall points 
out, I may have chosen to be an academic philosopher, but I still 
see the value in all sorts of other identities that I did not choose.25 
Indeed, such a view struggles to capture any kind of comparison 
between identities at all. We want to say that being an artist is in 
some sense better than being a nose-picker. Prior to our choice, 
though, how could we do so, if the choice is what confers the 
identity’s value? What’s more, if choices are their own ground, 
how can we evaluate any as better or worse? The threat of the 
arbitrary quickly looms. In fact, such a view seems to eliminate 
the need for practical identities altogether. Provided that we re-
main within the bounds of the moral law, why not simply choose 
freely from among our desires? After all, our decisions will justi-
fy themselves.  
Perhaps because of these obvious difficulties, Korsgaard of-
ten waffles on her constructivism, giving a greater normative 
role to desire and inclination than some of her constructivist 
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comments would suggest.26 For example, she claims in “Two 
Distinctions in Goodness” that desire “is the initial combination 
of the goodness of many good things, and so a main source of the 
goodness of those things.”27 Similarly, she says in “The Reasons 
We Can Share” that “chocolate gets its value from the way it af-
fects us. We confer value on it by liking it.”28 Since we do not 
choose to like chocolate, this last quote is in direct tension with 
the claim quoted above, that “it is our own choices that ultimate-
ly confer value on objects.”29 Such tension is part of a larger am-
biguity running through Korsgaard’s work, between, on the one 
hand, the claim that we create our reasons, and on the other, the 
claim that we discover them.30 Korsgaard is quite clear that, prior 
to endorsement, an impulse does not provide us a reason; rather, 
“that is what you have to decide about.”31 But she also says that 
“when an impulse presents itself to us, as a kind of candidate for 
being a reason, we look to see whether it really is a reason.”32 But 
how can we do so, if it is up to us to choose the answer? To get 
around this dilemma, Korsgaard seems to allow pre-endorsed 
but morally-permissible impulses a kind of pseudo-normativity, 
arising from desire, which calls the will to bestow upon them the 
real deal. Such impulses are not yet valuable per se, but they 
“answer to our nature in welcome ways.”33 Thus, though we cre-
ate our own reasons, we have pseudo-reasons, so to speak, to 
create the reasons that we do.  
At best, such pseudo-normativity is on shaky ground. Its 
force is unclear, its relationship to its big brother is questionable, 
and the combination of both creates an uncomfortable overlap, 
provoking the suspicion that there are, so to speak, too many 
normative cooks in the kitchen. Whatever its rational stability, 
however, the place of pseudo-normativity in Korsgaard’s ac-
count is quite revealing. Having released the will from all its 
earthly bonds, Korsgaard needs to reign it back in. She cannot 
give reasons, because the will must make its own reasons, so she 
entices it back with pseudo-reasons arising from desire, which 
the will then ratifies. But now it seems that the will is not so free 
after all. Left on its own, it has no internal content, save the Cate-
gorical Imperative, to guide it. Thus, it reels briefly in the moral-
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ly-permissible emptiness, then must return home to the earthly 
impulses that originally held it in bondage.  
To put this another way, what Korsgaard is confronting is the 
problem of the empty self. When you abstract yourself from all 
of your impulses and identities in order to choose among them, 
you are, as Korsgaard herself puts it, “too distant from yourself 
to make choices… your empty self can have no reason to do one 
thing rather than another.”34 Our practical identities are meant to 
solve this problem, but when we must choose our practical iden-
tities, it arises once more. Korsgaard acknowledges this issue in 
Self-Constitution, but addresses it directly with only a few cursory 
sentences:  
 
This is a false dilemma, arrived at by an artificial freezing 
of the observer’s mental frame. It assumes that the en-
dorsement of our identities, our self-constitution, is a 
state rather than an activity… but self-constitution is not a 
state that we achieve and from which action then issues… 
[rather], it is action itself.35 
 
The brevity of this argument makes it difficult to penetrate, 
but seen in the light of the discussion that follows, it becomes 
clearer. Throughout Self-Constitution, Korsgaard emphasizes that 
in everything we do, we are always already both self-constituted 
and self-constituting. We never empty, but neither are we ever 
full; rather, our actions and our practical identities exist in a dy-
namic interplay, each in a constant process of shaping the other. 
The empty self problem, Korsgaard suggests, comes only when 
you attempt to freeze this process and abstract the self from the 
basis of its choices. In reality, though, this never happens, so the 
problem does not arise.  
But we can accept this as an objective picture of our self-
constitution, and still maintain that from the perspective of a de-
liberating agent, the empty-self problem remains forceful. Even if 
I am never empty in reality, in order to choose my practical iden-
tities autonomously I cannot take any of them for granted. Ra-
ther, I must step outside of them, even if only for the purposes of 
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thought. Otherwise, my choice will not be truly mine; my deci-
sion to remain a Christian will not be made by me myself, but by 
my Christian practical identity – hardly a real choice. Indeed, 
Korsgaard understands this well: as she puts it in Sources of Nor-
mativity, options at hand are “the passively confronted material 
upon which the active will operates, and not the agent or active 
will itself.”36 When we must choose among our practical identi-
ties, the necessity of such a distance renders the problem of the 
empty self unresolved.  
Indeed, if we look back at the three ways of choosing we 
have considered –existing identities, epistemic ideals, or pure 
will – we see that in a sense the empty self has been our problem 
all along. Korsgaard’s account rests on the free will, but the free 
will needs practical identities to give it content. When we step 
back from such identities to choose among them, though, we are 
once again empty. Existing identities are no help, because they 
too have been called into question, and epistemic ideals are no 
help, because the epistemically ideal agent is also empty. Absent 
independent normative facts to guide us, the pure will seems the 
only resource left, but it too is empty, so its brute choices, though 
morally-permissible, are arbitrary and groundless. In this sense, 
it is Korsgaard’s failure to adequately address the problem of the 
empty self that prevents her from giving a satisfactory account of 
our choice of practical identities. Her free will is, so to speak, too 
free.  
I will conclude by briefly suggesting one possible step to-
wards resolving this problem. From the very start, one of the 
most implausible aspects of Korsgaard’s account has been her 
extreme voluntarism about practical identity. Many of our practi-
cal identities are contingent, she admits, but whether you take 
them as reason-giving is entirely “up to you.”37 But as Rachel Co-
hon points out, for many practical identities this just seems 
wrong: “we can try to repudiate them, but it may not work,” for 
their hold on us is to deep.38 A wife may try to reject her alle-
giance to her husband, or a citizen to her country, and find that 
nevertheless she cannot help but take those practical identities as 
reason-giving. In this sense, Korsgaard’s extreme voluntarism is 
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unrealistic. Perhaps, though, if we were to soften it, we could 
give certain practical identities such de facto pull that they could 
not be abandoned or plausibly stepped-back from. Certainly, this 
would limit our freedom; we would no longer wholly “create 
ourselves” in the manner Korsgaard wants.39 But perhaps such 
constraints are precisely what she needs to give the empty self 
some content. Of course, this proposal will clash with other as-
pects of Korsgaard’s project, and it leaves many questions unre-
solved. Nevertheless, given the implausibility of Korsgaard’s ex-
treme voluntarism, it seems a promising place to start.  
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Notes 
1. SC 116. 
2. SN 97. 
3. SC 76. 
4. See Anscomb, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Vir-
tue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1998) 26-31; and Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics, 
7th ed (London: Macmillan, 1967) 106. Stephen Darwall points 
out their agreement in his unpublished paper, “Grotius at the 
Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy.” 
5. SC 20. 
6. SC 20. 
7. SC 21. 
8. SC 23. 
9. SC 43. 
10. SC 20. 
11. 242, emphasis in the original. 
12. In Section IV of this paper, I examine the normativity of de-
sire more explicitly and suggest that some ambiguity sur-
rounds it. For the purposes of this section, though, 
Korsgaard’s clear statements that desires themselves cannot 
generate reasons are sufficient. 
13. See Gowans, Christopher. “Practical Identity and Autonomy: 
Korsgaard’s Reformation of Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 64, no. 3 (May 2002) 
p. 557; and Cohon, Rachel. “The Roots of Reasons,” The Philo-
sophical Review vol. 109, no. 1 (Jan. 200) p. 74 footnote. 
14. Gowans 557. 
15. Gowans 557. 
16. Sources 34-48, Self-Constitution 64-65. 
17. SN 35-6. 
18. In his article “Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard’s 
Reformation of Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” Christopher Gow-
ans suggests and then critiques this possibility. As will be-
come clear, I disagree with his critique. My initial discussion, 
though, is based off of his. 
19. Stephen Darwall suggests to me that such a view requires a 
further caveat: that an epistemically ideal agent choose not 
for herself qua epistemically ideal, but rather for herself in 
everyday epistemic conditions – conditions that the ideal 
agent will, so to speak, “re-enter.” I am not aware of the re-
search that motivates this caveat, but it seems plausible, and 
everything I say should be consistent with it. For the sake of 
simplicity, though, I have chosen not to build it into the pre-
sent discussion explicitly. 
20. 564. 
21. 569. 
22. SN 239. 
23. 114, emphasis in the original. 
24. SC 123. 
25. Discussion at Yale University on April 29, 2011.  
26. Hannah Ginsborg examines this waffling in “Korsgaard on 
Choosing Nonmoral Ends,” Ethics 109 (October 1998) p. 7 
footnote. 
27. CKE 268. 
28. CKE 284. 
29. SC 123. 
30. Ginsborg and Cohon both point to this ambiguity. See the 
Ginsborg footnote cited above and Cohon, “Roots of Rea-
sons,” 68. 
31. SC 123. 
32. SN 108. 
33. 123. 
34. SC 43. 
35. 44. 
36. 241. 
37. SC 23. 
38. Cohon 70. 
39. SC 20.  
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